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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICES AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE JUDICIAL
BUDGET:
State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship
On June 19, 1978, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia reiterated and enlarged upon two sensitive and vital areas
of law: disqualification of justices and the constitutional status of
the judicial budget. The issues were prompted by the actions of the
West-Virginia Legislature during the 1978 regular session and cul-
minated in State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship.I
Two members of the West Virginia State Bar, as attorneys and
taxpayers, presented a petition for a writ of mandamus to require
the Clerk of the House of Delegates to record and publish a cor-
rected budget bill reflecting the judiciary budget as submitted by
the judiciary's administrative director. The disputed bill, which
had been passed by the legislature and approved by the Governor,
reflected decreases in five judiciary items.
This case began with the submission of the judiciary's 1978-
1979 budget to the State Auditor in accordance with the Judicial
Reorganization Amendment2 and article VI, section 51 of the West
Virginia Constitution.' The request totalled $14,911,054, but in-
cluded in this figure were $375,400 of proposed salary increases. If
these increases were not enacted by the legislature, the court ad-
ministrator advised the representatives that the request would
consequently be reduced to $14,535,654. The salary increases were
in fact deleted and the budget bill submitted by the Governor
reflected the lesser amount. However, the budget bill reported out
of the joint conference committee and passed by the legislature
disclosed a total for the judiciary of $12,741,034. Five line items-
personal services, other expenses, other court costs, judicial train-
ing program and the law libraries program were decreased-
resulting in a reduction of $1,794,620. The petition for a writ of
mandamus soon followed.
246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1978).
2 In March 1974, the legislature proposed the Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment to the constitution which was ratified at the general election on November 5,
1974.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(B) outlines the procedure for legislative appropri-
ations.
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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUSTICE McGRAw
Upon presentation of the petition for a writ of mandamus, four
justices of the court voluntarily disqualified themselves. Justice
McGraw declared that he knew of no good and valid reason to
require his disqualification and declined to disqualify himself. He
and four retired judges of the state convened and heard the case.'
The respondent, C.A. Blankenship, Clerk of the House of Dele-
gates, filed a motion that Justice McGraw disqualify himself from
the case, or, in the alternative, that the permanent members of the
court or the special panel take the necessary action to disqualify
him. The motion was referred to the permanent members of the
court, who declared themselves disqualified for all issues.' The
motion was then redirected to the special panel.
The respondent cited "bias, prejudice, partiality, and due pro-
cess violations" as requiring the disqualification of the justice and
included newspaper exhibits which allegedly expressed public crit-
icism by Justice McGraw of the legislature's actions.' With Justice
McGraw abstaining from this portion of the opinion, the court
concluded that it had no power or authority to disqualify him from
the proceedings when the justice, in his own judgment and discre-
tion, had found no reason to do so.
At early English common law, a judge could be disqualified
from hearing a case only if it could be shown that he had an
"interest" in the case This "interest" alludes to a direct pecuni-
ary interest in the outcome,' and the principle prompted Lord
Coke's famous maxim, aliquis non debet esse judex in propria
causa-no man shall be a judge in his own case.8 Eventually, pecu-
niary interest was joined by "relationship to a party" and
I The Judicial Reorganization Amendment provides:
A retired justice or judge may, with his permission and with the approval
of the supreme court of appeals, be recalled by the chief justice of the
supreme court of appeals for temporary assignment as a justice of the
supreme court of appeals, or judge of an intermediate court, a circuit
court or a magistrate court.
W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 8.
3 246 S.E.2d at 106.
6 Id.
7 Regina v. Hertfordshire, Justices, 6 Q.B. 753 (1845).
Note, 5th Circuit Adopts Standard for Disqualification of Judges for Bias, 7
CumB. L. REv. 185, 188 (1976).
1 Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K. B. 1609).
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"previous involvement as counsel in the case" as grounds requiring
the disqualification of a judge.'"
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals follows the
common-law grounds for disqualification" and the legislature has
enlarged upon them by codification." Interest" and relationship to
a party'4 have been recognized by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals as grounds for disqualification of trial judges.
Bias and partiality, not due to interest or relationship, however,
have been slow to gain recognition in the West Virginia courts.
Only recently did the court in Louk v. Haynes'5 call for disqualifi-
cation of a judge where circumstances evinced a possibility of bias
and subsequent due process violations. Louk is noted in Bagley"
10 For an excellent summary, see Note, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J.
605, 609-12 (1947).
11 State ex rel. Monongalia Valley Traction Co. v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 99
S.E. 452 (1919).
"1 [W]hen such a judge [circuit, criminal or intermediate] is a
party to a suit, or is interested in the result therefor otherwise than as a
resident or taxpayer of the district or county, or is related to either of the
parties, as a father, father-in-law, son, son-in-law, brother, brother-in-
law, nephew, uncle, first cousin, or guardian, or if at the time of the
institution of the suit, or at any time before its final determination, he,
his wife, or any party or parties related to him in the degree hereinbefore
specified, is a stockholder, or officer, in any stock company or corporation
which is a necessary party to the proceedings, or if he is a material witness
for either party, he shall not take cognizance thereof unless all parties to
the suit consent thereto in writing .... W. Va. Code § 51-2-8 (1976
Replacement Vol.).
11 State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E. 2d 467 (W. Va. 1975); State
ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1974); State ex rel. Brotherton
v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1973); State ex rel. Matko v. Ziegler, 154
W. Va. 872, 179 S.E.2d 735 (1971); Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d
610 (1961); Cheuvront v. Holmer, 62 W. Va. 476, 59 S.E. 964 (1908); City of Grafton
v. Holt, 58 W. Va. 182, 52 S.E. 21 (1905).
14 State ex rel. Monongalia Valley Traction Co. v. Beard, 84 W. Va. 312, 99
S.E. 452 (1919).
11 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976). The court concludes that:
We find, therefore, that under the facts and circumstances of this case,
petitioner was also denied due process of law because of the failure of the
trial judge to recuse himself .... We do not hold that every sentencing
judge is per se ineligible from hearing and deciding an issue of probation
revocation. Where, however, a challenge to a judge's impartiality is made
for substantial reasons which indicate what the circumstances offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, a judge should
recuse himself. Id. at 791.
11 246 S.E.2d at 106.
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but is summarily disregarded as correct but inapplicable. Louk is
a criminal case and the bias arises from the fact that the sentenc-
ing judge later acted as judge in a parole revocation hearing. Al-
though it may be inapplicable for the purposes of Bagley due to
factual differences therewith, it is important to note that the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has at least once held that a
circuit court judge committed prejudicial error by failing to dis-
qualify himself due to bias. Bagley, unfortunately, leaves one with
the impression that disqualification on grounds of bias and partial-
ity is solely a personal decision and the court is completely power-
less even to review such issues after a judge has refused to relin-
quish his position. 7
The distinction between Louk and Bagley could lead one to
suggest that there should be distinct standards utilized for the
disqualification of circuit court judges as opposed to supreme court
justices. In Louk the decision necessitated a review of the circum-
stances of a probation violation and a personal evaluation of the
offender. In such a case, bias and partiality are more than merely
relevant: they could easily be decisive. On the other hand, in cases
where the issue is one of interpreting the existing law or constitu-
tional provisions, personal bias or partiality should theoretically
not be a factor in the decision.
It is not contended that the supreme court justices had abso-
lutely no personal interest in the outcome of Bagley. Though their
individual salaries are fixed by statute, their office budgets, library
funds and training programs were reduced. The predominant issue
to be determined, however, was not the reasonableness or necessity
of the individual items in the budget request, but whether the
legislature had acted in violation of the constitution. As the court
said, "[tihe controlling issue . . . can readily be decided on bases
of well-established principles of constitutional law. Contamination
of the balance through personal feelings, bias, prejudice or partial-
ity is foreign to the decisional process in such cases. '"'
It was then asserted that the authority for the court to disqual-
ify Justice McGraw is found in the West Virginia Constitution. As
11 Id., quoting State ex rel. Matko v. Ziegler, 154 W. Va. 872, 179 S.E.2d 735
(1971), where the plaintiff had sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from
proceeding in the case: "A majority of this Court, Judge Browning not participat-
ing, denies that motion for the reason that the question whether Judge Browning
should participate in the consideration and decision of this proceeding should be
decided by him and not by this Court."
"1 Id. at 107.
[Vol. 81
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Bagley correctly points out,'" however, the constitution only gives
the Supreme Court of Appeals the power to "censure or temporar-
ily suspend" a judge or justice for violation of the Judicial Code
of Ethics.
Disqualification is only mentioned in Canon 3(C) of the Judi-
cial Code of Ethics. Canon 3(C) states that a judge or justice
"should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartial-
ity might reasonably be questioned,""-' but does not say that he
must disqualify himself, or that the court is empowered to disqual-
ify a jiidge or justice. Therefore, at the present time in West Vir-
ginia, as unfair as it may seem to litigants, if a judge wrongfully
refuses to disqualify himself due to bias or partiality, the remedy
is an "after the fact" reprimand or temporary suspension for a
violation of the Code of Ethics unless, as in Louk, an actual denial
of due process is found on appeal.2
Canon 3(A)(6) mandates that judges and justices are to
"abstain from public comment about a pending or impending pro-
ceeding in any court." The section goes on, however, to state that
comments made "in the course of their official duties" or for
"explaining for public information the procedures of the court" are
not prohibited.21.1 The court in Bagley properly indicated that the
issue to be decided was the authority of the court to disqualify a
justice, not to determine if Justice McGraw violated the Code of
Ethics. That is a determination to be made through judicial self-
regulation by the Commission of Inquiry and Judicial Board of
Review. 212
10 Id.
The provision, in applicable part, provides:
Under its inherent rule-making power, which is hereby declared, the
supreme court of appeals shall, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, pro-
mulgate and amend rules prescribing a judicial code of ethics, and a code
of regulations and standards of conduct and performances for justices,
judges and magistrates, along with sanctions and penalties for any viola-
tion thereof, and the supreme court of appeals is authorized to censure
or temporarily suspend any justice, judge or magistrate having the judi-
cial power of the State, including one of its own members, for any viola-
tions of any such code of ethics, code of regulations and standards, or to
retire any such justice, judge or magistrate who is eligible for retirement
under the West Virginia judges' retirement system.
W. Va. Const. art. VII, § 8.
2" W. VA. Co E, Judicial Code of Ethics, 3(C)(1) (1978 Replacement Vol.).
21 Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
21.1 W. VA. CODE, Judicial Code of Ethics, 3(A)(6) (1978 Replacement Vol.).
21.2 The present Judicial Code of Ethics was adopted by the Supreme Court
5
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Bagley, in reiterating precedent and constitutional and statu-
tory principles concerning disqualification of judges or justices for
bias or prejudice, points to an obviously deficient and sensitive
area of West Virginia law. Litigants may have virtually no means
of having a judge removed on grounds of bias or partiality prior to
trial,22 for it is the challenged judge who rules on the motion. The
fear of causing judicial hostility by filing of a motion may prevent
many litigants from even raising the issue. This unfortunate state
of affairs exists in West Virginia and, as evidenced by Bagley, any
needed changes will not be forthcoming from the courts.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATURE'S ACTIONS
A delicate, but precarious balance exists between the three
branches of our government. Theoretically, the balance should be
maintained by the competing doctrines of the separation of powers
and checks and balances. The foundation for the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers is the philosophical theory that governmental
power should be limited. The method to do so is to allocate that
power among three separate, but equal, branches.? The doctrine
of separation of powers is clearly embodied in the West Virginia
Constitution," as it is in the constitutions of almost every other
state in the nation.? But the West Virginia Constitution provides
for almost complete fiscal independence for the judiciary branch,
contrary to most other state policies.2 1
of Appeals by order dated July 16, 1976. This order recognizes the authority of the
Court to establish such a code of ethics and the authority of the Commission of
Inquiry and Judicial Board of Review to enforce the Code's penalties and sanctions
pursuant to article VIII, § 8 of the West Virginia Constitution. W. VA. CODE,
Judicial Code of Ethics, Editor's note, (1978 Replacement Vol.).
2 See Note, Recusal of Judges, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 766 (1975).
2 A. Vanderbilt, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-
DAY SiGiNiFCANcE (1953).
24 W. VA. CONST., art. V, §1, provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers
of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall
be eligible for the legislature."
n E.g., KY. CONST. § 27; MASS. CONSr. art. 30; Miss. CONST. art. 1, § 1; N. C.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; TEx. CONST. art. 2, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
2 Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. Rxv. 277, 281 (1971). In
particular, the author states:
The extent of the legislative power over the judicial budget remains an
open question in Colorado, while in Maryland and West Virginia the
legislatures may not reduce or delete items from the judicial budget,
although they may make increases. In all other states the budget of the
[Vol. 81
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Historically, all governmental appropriations and budgeting
have been considered to be a function of the legislative branch
because it possesses the power of taxation.Y The executive branch
had veto power, but the judicial branch had no "power over the
purse" and consequently the judiciary was, and often still is,
considered to be the weakest of the three branches. "
The legislature of West Virginia evidently regarded this ab-
sence of judicial control over its own budget as a flaw and passed
the "Budget Amendment" as section 51 of article VI of the consti-
tution, which was ratified at the general election on November 5,
1918. This amendment provided that the legislature could not cre-
ate a deficit bill by "increasing or diminishing the items therein
relating to the legislature, and by increasing the items relating to
the judiciary."-' A later amendment" was ratified in 1968 and
added the current wording that "no item relating to the judiciary
shall be decreased. ' '30.1
The portion of the West Virginia Constitution relating to
budgeting and appropriations was adopted from the constitution
of the state of Maryland.3' It is of interest to note that prior to 1972,
Maryland's constitution gave that state legislature power only to
"increase" items relating to the judiciary, but the Amendment of
1972 changed the wording to now read that the "General Assembly
may amend the bill . . . by increasing or diminishing the items
therein relating to the judiciary. ' 31 -1 Apparently, the people of
Maryland had second thoughts about a complete, fiscally indepen-
dent judiciary.
Bagley presents a paradox, not new to the West Virginia
court,3" between the theory that the legislature in its role as the
judicial branch ... is subject to modification by the legislature. Id. at
281 (footnotes omitted).
21 Note, Judicial Power- The Inherent Power of the Courts to Compel Funding
for Their Own Needs, 53 WASH. L. REv. 331 (1978).
2, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). Cited also in Bagley, 246 S.E.2d at
104.
' A. Vanderbilt, THE DocrTM OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-
DAY SIGNIFICANCE, 97-98 (1953).
"' W. VA. CONST., art. VI, § 51 (1966).
3 The Modem Budget Amendment, proposed by House Joint Resolution No.
3 in 1967.
3-' W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(B)(5) (1978 Replacement Vol.).
31 MD. CONST. art. I, § 52(6). Also noted in State ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 133
W. Va. 244, 270-71, 77 S.E.2d 122, 138 (1953).
3.1 MD. CONsT. art. I, § 52(6) (emphasis added).
32 State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1973).
7
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tax levying body should control the agency it funds, and the doc-
trine that the courts, to administer justice fairly, must be indepen-
dent of the legislative and executive branches.3
Nationally, the debate between interdbpendence and inde-
pendence is raging in numerous states.3' Many factors areinotivat-
ing the crisis: overcrowded courts, lengthy litigation, more judicial
activities, and outmoded methods of administration. State judici-
aries are desperately in need of mechanization of records, new
facilities, and, more staff. In the majority of states, the past and
most prevalent method today to compel the much needed funding
is through the court's assertion of its inherent power to force legis-
lative or county agencies to appropriate money. 5 This existence of
inherent power is not often disputed; rather, it is the determina-
tion of the extent of this power which is at the heart of the contro-
versy. 3 6
The peculiar nature of the West Virginia Constitution clearly
and specifically grants the judiciary complete fiscal independ-
ence. 7 Where "a constitutional provision is clear in its terms, and
the intention of the electorate is clearly embraced in the language
of the provision itself, this Court must apply and not interpret the
provision."3
The legislature had done an act which was plainly unconstitu-
tional in reducing five line items of the judiciary budget request.
Whether the action was correct or justified could not have been an
issue. The petition for a writ of mandamus to correct the budget
bill was the proper action under West Virginia constitutional law. 9
" For a good theoretical overview, see Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and
Inherent Power, 57 ComnFu L. Rav. 975 (1972).
Roush, Financing the Judiciary-Time for a New Approach, 1974 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 639.
3 E.g., Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966);
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971); Leahey v.
Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 57 (1949); In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232,
552 P.2d 163 (1976).
3' Note, Judical Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. Ray.
975, 979 (1972).
3' W. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 51(5): "The legislature shall not amend the budget
bill so as to create a deficit but may amend the bill by increasing or decreasing any
item therein: Provided, that no item relating to the judiciary shall be decreased
This principle has been reiterated numerous times by the West Virginia
Court. E.g., State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 207 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1973);
State ex rel. Trent v. Sims, 138 W. Va. 244, 77 S.E.2d 122 (1953).
" "Mandamus lies to require the discharge by a public officer of a nondiscre-
[Vol. 81
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Unlike the situation in other states, there is no need for the West
Virginia judiciary to assert its inherent power to compel funding.
The judiciary cannot ignore an unconstitutional act, and effect
must be given to such a clear provision as section 51 of article VI
of the West Virginia Constitution. The decision of Bagley to award
the writ of mandamus was the only constitutionally correct deci-
sion which could have been made.
Both issues presented in Bagtey are theoretical and philosoph-
ical problems for which few scholars have immediate or exacting
solutions. As with the issue of disqualification, the resolution of the
debate between interdependence and independence of the judicial
branch will probably not come from the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. If the people perceive a financially independent
judiciary as truly a threat to the stability or longevity of the demo-
cratic form of government, then they may voice their collective
opinions in the form of a vote to amend the constitution. Bagley
simply draws attention to these problems, it offers no solutions.
Kathleen Duffield
tionary duty." Syllabus pt. 3, State e reL Greenbrier County Airport Auth. v.
Hanna, 151 W. Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967).
9
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